disadvantages of the grand ethiopian renaissance dam disadvantages of the grand ethiopian renaissance dam

A regional framework for the management of the Nile already existsthe Nile Basin Initiative mentioned abovewhich is a partnership among the Nile riparian states that was launched in 1999. In March 2015, a 'Declaration of Principles' was signed by the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, setting the foundations for an initial cooperation (Salman, 2017). Monday January 2, 2017. Egypt, which lies 1,600 miles downstream of the Dam, believes its operation will reduce the amount of fresh water available to it from the Nile. It will also give Ethiopia more control . Even then, the initial studies did not extend beyond the borders with Kenya. (2014). Misplaced Opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD): Update. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 79-110. Moreover, after the completion of the GERD, Egypt could run short of water if the operation of the GERD was not carefully coordinated with that of the AHD. Despite several tripartite meetings between November 2013 and January 2014, no agreement was reached on the implementation of the IPoE recommendations and controversies were evolving around the constitution of a trilateral committee. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is a critical project that intends to provide hydroelectricity to support the livelihoods of millions of people in the region. Terms in this set (10) how long and high is the dam? The latter, in Article 2(4), allocated acquired rights of 66% of Nile water to Egypt and 22% to Sudan (with the remaining 12% attributed to leakage). Officials in Addis Ababa argue that the GERD will have no major impact on water flow into the Nile, instead arguing that the hydropower dam will provide benefits to countries in the region, including as a source of affordable electric power and as a major mechanism for the management of the Nile, including the mitigation of droughts and water salinity. The Chinese donors who have agreed to fund it have performed no independent social or environmental impact reviews. It concludes that Ethiopias legal position is far stronger and that a negotiated agreement in its favour is the most likely outcome of the dispute. The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Afraid that a drought might appear during the filling period, Egypt wants the filling to take place over a much longer period. In my opinion, this should be negotiable, to fill the lake over a longer period, and only when the river is sufficiently full. On March 4, 1982, Bertha Wilson became the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. They can also cause dispute and heartachefor example, over damage to. This crisis has raised great concerns among large sectors of the Egyptian society, especially in light of recalling such statements as "water war," "water militarization," "military management of the GERD crisis," "water terrorism," and "Ethiopian hydro-hegemony over the Nile Basin" [ 1, 2 ]. Location l Formerly called as project x then known as the Millennium Dam then it renamed to Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Whittington, D. et al. Match. Sudan is caught between the competing interests of Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt and Ethiopia have once again locked horns over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. (eds.). 67K views 6 months ago ETIOPIA The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile, is located around 14 km upstream of the Ethiopian-Sudan Border, at around 700 km from the Capital. "Today as you see behind me . Cameroon's Choupo-Moting scores winner as Bayern reclaim Bundesliga top.. English Premier League results & fixtures (26th matchday), Germany Bundesliga results & fixtures (23rd matchday), Israeli delegation expelled from the African Union summit. Downstream countries Egypt and Sudan have expressed concerns over the impacts of the dam on their water supply. On the contrary, GERD has a positive impact in terms of reducing flood and silting and boost water conservation as well as generate energy for the region. As stipulated by an Agreement of 1959 (see:Nile Main Conflict), Egypt and Sudan presented for several decades a common position vis--vis other riparians regarding the utilisation and management of Nile waters. The dispute escalated in 2011 when Ethiopia began construction of a major new dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), in the absence of any agreement with downstream Egypt. Another argument Egypt might adduce concerns the DoP. In recognition of the fact that the Nile Waters Treaties had become an uncomfortable and anachronistic vestige of colonialism, ten watercourse states along the Nile (including Egypt and Ethiopia) agreed in 1999 to form the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). At 6,000 MW, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed at 2017(IPoE, 2013). Learn. The politicisation of the Niles water and the utilisation of development projects to achieve political ends are not new phenomena. Ethiopia has never 'consumed' significant shares of the Nile's water so far, as its previous political and economic fragility in combination with a lack of external financial support, due to persistent Egyptian opposition to projects upstream, prevented it from implementing large-scale projects. It can be demand-driven, typically caused by population growth, and supply-driven, typically caused by decreasing amounts of fresh water often resulting from climate change or a result of societal factors such as poverty. It too has legal arguments it could adduce in support of its position that the Dam is permitted under international law. Ethiopias strategy for dam construction goes far beyond developmental goals. While the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is taking shape on . When it is completed, with its concrete volume of 10.2 million m3, GERD will feature the largest dam in Africa. Ethiopia is pinning its hopes of economic development and power generation on the dam. Review a brief history of copyright in the United States. Despite the controversy and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam's effect on Egypt and Sudan, it appears that the Ethiopian government will continue to move forward with filling the dam. Ethiopia has never 'consumed' significant shares of the Niles water so far, as its previous political and economic fragility in combination with a lack of external financial support, due to persistent Egyptian opposition to projects upstream, prevented it from implementing large-scale projects. Test. l Coordinates 111255N 3505 . It is therefore intrinsically connected with the question of land ownership. Crucially, however, neither Egypt nor Ethiopia are parties to the Watercourses Convention and so they are not bound by its terms. Sign up for news on environment, conflict and cooperation. This is hardly a revelation, as this strategy has long been foremost in the minds of the ruling elites in Addis Ababa and supported by the international powers. An unsubscribe function is also at the bottom of every newsletter. Disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), hailed by both Egypt and Ethiopia as a new chapter in relations between Egypt and Ethiopia based on openness and mutual understanding and cooperation (. Ethiopia has two major plans for these rivers, which both flow into Somalia, in the form of the Wabe Shebelle and the Genale Dawa power plants. You must have JavaScript enabled to use this form. Given agricultures importance to pro-poor economic growth, Egypt, which has significant experience and expertise in irrigation agriculture, can share some of that expertise with other countries in exchange for increased trade with them. In contrast, other watercourse states on the Nile have lent their support to the Dam. Because the strategy of land allocation and dam construction relied on senior executive decisions and foreign funding from China, above all, the government was largely freed of pressures of transparency and accountability. What Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia must overcome to all benefit from the Grand Renaissance Dam. The Ethiopian government is spending $4.7 billion to construct the 1,780-meter dam across the Blue Nile. It states in Principle III that the parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm. Therefore, a negotiated position that favours Ethiopia is likely to be reached once it becomes politically palatable enough inside Egypt. Ethiopias dam-construction strategy threatens not only Kenyas water-resource development efforts but also Somalias water security, as is evidenced by Ethiopias development plans for the Jubba and Shebelle Rivers. It simultaneously expects that this role will change Ethiopias international status from a country perceived as poor and dependent on foreign aid to a regional power able to provide vital resources to its surrounding region. There are three key articles. The final touches to these plans were added in 2005 and 2007, and one involves nine hydroelectric dams along the Gebale Dawa to produce some 1,300 MW of electricity for export. Following the fall of Mengistu Haile-Mariams regime in Ethiopia in 1991, Ethiopia experienced a remarkable rise in the construction of dams and hydroelectric power stations. Second, regarding the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, although Ethiopia was a party and although that instrument does deal with the flow of water on the Nile, its terms are strictly limited. The Gerd is expected to generate over 5,000 megawatts of electricity, doubling the nation's . It's free to sign up and bid on jobs. AFRICANGLOBE. Perhaps even more consequential is the fact that this agreement granted Egypt veto power over future Nile River projects. One question that keeps coming up is: Will Ethiopia be willing to release enough water from the reservoir to help mitigate a drought downstream? The Nile is not a boundary-delimiting river, hence Ethiopia would almost certainly argue that the exception should not be applied here. The Chinese then took over the funding amidst heightened international concern regarding the social, technical, and environmental repercussions of the Ethiopian dams. In addition, no independent, multilateral Environmental and Social Impact Assessments has been carried out suggesting that Ethiopia is reneging from the 2015 Declaration of Principles (Kandeel, 2020). Ethiopian general threatens military force to defend Nile dam as negotiations with Egypt falter. International rights organisations have reported that many cases of displacement were not voluntary and that entire communities were driven from their villages. Water Policy, 16(4), 595-608. Subsequent impact studies were performed by the European Investment Bank and the African Development Bank, and in the light of the results, these banks cancelled their funding for Gibe III. Over the years, Egypt has used its extensive diplomatic connections and the colonial-era 1929 and 1959 agreements to successfully prevent the construction of any major infrastructure projects on the tributaries of the Nile. As a result, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has recognised water security as a possible threat to international peace. On the surface, the 558 ft tall dam Africa's biggest hydropower project belies Ethiopia's financial muscle. Another impressive snippet of information is that the Government of Ethiopia is financing the entire project, along with loans mainly from China. Crucially, however, despite being signed by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, the legal status of the DoP was left (deliberately) vague. First woman appointed to the Canada Supreme Court. This is on the basis of the principles of State succession as outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States (VCSS). In March 2015, a 'Declaration of Principles' was signed by the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, setting the foundations for an initial cooperation. The dam will flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia (an area about four times the size of Cairo), displace approximately 20,000 people in Ethiopia, and create a reservoir that will hold around 70 billion cubic . Although Khartoum initially opposed the construction of the GERD, it has since warmed up to it, citing its potential to improve prospects for domestic development. Elliot Winter is a lecturer (assistant professor) in international law at Newcastle University in the United Kingdom. In short, the Nile Waters Treaties do little to constrain Ethiopias ability to construct the Dam. Construction on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam began in 2011 and it is currently nearing completion. 17th round of GERD tripartite talks hits wall in Cairo. To date, no significant harm has been caused to Egypt or Sudan as a result of the ongoing construction of the GERD. In terms of the current status of talks, in 2019, US Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin began facilitating negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia which led to some tentative progress. Egypt, fearing major disruptions to its access to the Nile's waters, originally intended to prevent even the start of the GERD's construction. In the end, all 11 riparian states must understand that the way forward calls for the establishment of a meaningful resource-sharing agreement, one that sees and recognizes the Nile River as a regional watercourse. Ethiopia is pinning its hopes of economic development and power generation on the Blue Nile dam, which Egypt fears will imperil its water supply. Salman, S.M.A. The New Arab (2020b). Ethiopias interests in developing its water resources are driven by its growing population and high demand for socio-economic development (Gebreluel, 2014). For nearly a century, as a legacy of colonialism, Egypt enjoyed what Tekuya referred to as a hydro-hegemony over the Nile; despite Ethiopia contributing 86% to its waters. Hence, it is hard to see how Egypt could make a compelling argument that it has been harmed by the Dam. At the same. Given the advancement of the dam construction - the GERD being, as of March 2015, 40% complete, according to Ethiopia - Egypt had good reason to reconsider its position (RANE, 2015). Despite the intense disagreements, though, Ethiopia continues to move forward with the dam, arguing that the hydroelectric project will significantly improve livelihoods in the region more broadly. Some have mythified it and claim it is the Gihon River of the Biblical Book of Genesis that encircles the entire land of Cush, thereby adding a religious dimension to the politicisation. Egypt accuses. However, for the reasons given above, the Nile Waters Treaties are unlikely to be considered territorial treaties. (2020). According to Article 16, former colonies do not inherit the treaty obligations of their former colonial rulers and instead receive a clean slate. However, Egypt could argue that the territorial treaty exception, under Articles 11 and 12, applies whereby colonial treaty provisions concerning boundaries must survive the impact of succession and bind successor states. Cairo Controversy prevailed in the Egyptian public opinion, after Deltares, a Dutch advisory institute, announced on Sept. 15 its withdrawal from a study to assess the risks that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is under construction on the Blue Nile, can cause to Egypt and Sudan. Recently, the tensions among Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile have escalated, particularly after Ethiopia announced that it had started filling the GERDs reservoir, an action contrary to Egypts mandate that the dam not be filled without a legally binding agreement over the equitable allocation of the Niles waters. The other riparian states can then be brought in, either through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) or some other regional framework, to secure an agreement that is binding on all the states. Why the Nile could see a 'water war'. Workers move iron girders from a crane at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), near Guba, Ethiopia, on Dec. 26, 2019. If it were to take place during a sequence of years in which the Blue Nile flow and the AHD reservoir itself was low, Egypt might not be able to withdraw sufficient water supplies to meet all of its agricultural needs. This is because it is traditionally understood to refer to waterways that form intrinsic parts of international boundaries. However, an agreement was still far from reach. (2014). The colonial powers have departed and so to continue to enforce treaties agreed based around their interests would be irrational. It's very unpredictable and it can be very dangerous," says Pottinger. [35] The lack of international financing for projects on the Blue Nile River has persistently been attributed to Egypt's campaign to keep control on the Nile water share. The above-mentioned Gilgel Gibe III Dam stood out as the worlds most controversial dam until the GERD. Although Egypt has persistently argued that the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is the legal framework for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states reject that argument. 1800m long and 170m high. Although talks chaired by President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa on behalf of the African Union have resolved many issues associated with the filling of the GERDs reservoir, there is still no agreement on the role that the dam will play in mitigating droughts. It signifies that Egypts de facto veto power on major upstream dams has been broken, and it clearly demonstrates the political will of Ethiopia to develop its water infrastructure even in the absence of a comprehensive basin agreement. But this did not rule out eruptions of tension, not just between local communities and the central government, but also between Ethiopia and its neighbours. It also created a counter message to Egypts powerful the Nile is Egypt narrative that is familiar around the world. Link, P.M. et al. If the relevant parties can agree to these goals, the agreement, in the end, will need to include technical language that ensures equitable sharing of the Nile. Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate. The piece (i) gives a brief history of the Dam; (ii) outlines the role of the Watercourses Convention; (iii) explains the significance of the Nile Waters Treaties; (iv) sets out the main legal arguments for Egypt and (v) provides the main legal arguments for Ethiopia. No water at all was allocated to Ethiopia. Attempts to resolve the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute over the past decade have reached a deadlock. Similarly, in 2018, the UNSC noted the water security risks in African nations such as Somalia, Sudan and Mali. In that light, Egypt should minimize trips to Washington, D.C., New York, and Brussels, and instead use its diplomatic resources to improve its relations with the other riparian states. What are the disadvantages of the Aswan Dam? IDS (2013). The official narrative is that Ethiopia can uproot poverty and bring about a definitive end to social and economic underdevelopment by means of the construction of a series of mega-dams combined with the development of the national energy infrastructure. The most important of these treaties is the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the Watercourses Convention). Cairo - U.S. Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador Mike Hammer met with senior Egyptian government officials on July 25 to advance a diplomatic resolution on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that supports the water needs, economy, and livelihood of all Egyptians, Sudanese, and Ethiopians. In fact, the Dam arguably smooths out the flow and mitigates the risk of both drought and floods. It will take between eight and ten years to fill the new dam. Ethiopia, however, prefers to have the flexibility to make decisions on how to deal with droughts. Ethiopia should get its fair share of water that originates in Ethiopia. According to some estimates, the Ethiopian government had to arrange for the resettlement of 1.5 million people in the four regions of Gambela, Somali, Afar, and Benishangul-Gumuz. The significance of Gulf involvement was highlighted by the . Match. The unilateral decision taken by Ethiopia - which never recognised the 1959 agreement but had previously not been able to challenge it in fact - to build the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011 represents a major political challenge to the 1959 Agreement. This is because the VCLT allows an older treaty to be rescinded by a new one if the new one concerns the same topic (Article 59). The Nile-COM is the highest political and decisionmaking body of the NBI. Cooperation among the three countries has never been more important as demand for water rises, she added, due to factors such as population growth, urbanization and industrialization. In June 2020, tensions escalated when Ethiopia declared its intent to fill the dam in July without an agreement, which again led to Egypt and Sudan requesting UNSC intervention on the matter (Kandeel, 2020). It imports about half its food products and recycles about 25 bcm of water annually. 2011. how much does the reservoir contain? Swain, A. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) constitutes a real crisis for the Egyptian regime, where Ethiopia several times blamed Egypt for the failure of negotiations conducted between Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia on the dam. The writer is a professor of political science at the UAEs Zayed and Cairo universities, *A version of this article appears in print in the 9 July, 2020 edition ofAl-Ahram Weekly, Spain La Liga results & fixtures (24th matchday). (2017). In the absence of the application of the Watercourses Convention, various other legal arrangements and political declarations must be considered to gain an understanding of the regulation of the Dam and the Nile River more generally. Success on this endeavor will only occur under a legally binding regime that ensures mutually beneficial rights. An argument could be made that some of its provisions have passed into customary international law, however, that would require clear general practice and opinio juris. However, it also entails potential negative effects on Egypt, if not carefully managed (see alsoSecurity implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt). Lastly, over-year storage facilities upstream in Ethiopia will allow Sudan to increase its water use. The Dam is used to generate electricity and went into partial operation in 2022. The instrument was a success in terms of cooling tensions between the states which seemed increasingly likely to come to blows. casting the DoP as a treaty) has the potential to abrogate the Nile Waters Treaties that Egypt holds so dear. The current filling which is ongoing since early July 2021 has presented no issues as well. Since plans for Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were first announced in 2011, Cairo has viewed the project as a serious threat to the country's water supply. In an effort to forestall potential water conflicts such as the one brewing around the Dam, an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral water agreements have been concluded in recent decades.